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ENSURING CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
OVERSEAS: A CIVILIAN EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION ACT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO
EXPANSION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
ABSTRACT
This Note considers the advisability of amending the False Claims Act’s
qui tam provisions beyond instances of fraud to include criminal allegations
against government contractors employed overseas. It considers the negative
effects that result from qui tam actions in the fraud context and discusses
alternatives for holding contractors accountable for crimes committed overseas that could avoid those negative effects. This Note particularly focuses
on and recommends a civilian corollary to the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act—the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. It discusses
the benefits that the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act would provide
such as increased judicial efficiency, increased prosecutorial flexibility, and
even protection of the contractors implicated as compared to the relatively
uncertain option of local nations’ laws.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States federal government quite literally employs more
contractors for services than it can count.1 The government’s limited ability to even count its service contractors can result in a lack of domestic
accountability for their contract performance. This lack of accountability
for service contractors is compounded when contractors commit criminal
acts2 because of the lack of jurisdiction by American courts to punish the
wrongdoers3 and a reluctance to submit American citizens to local justice.
This accountability gap may remain in the public consciousness with the
necessary political attention only so long as the country remains actively
engaged overseas and employs service contractors. As America draws
down its military engagements and troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and shifts its military response tactics toward more remote, hands-off
methods,4 public awareness of the lack of accountability and political will
to patch the accountability gap legislatively will also dwindle. Better than
risk waiting for a scandal to revive public concern, the accountability gap
must be solved while the issue is in the public consciousness. A legislative
fix may not only help prevent future political scandals, but would also
allow contracting companies to operate more effectively both internally
and overseas by clearly defining their potential for liability before contract
performance begins.5
1

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-1007, CIVILIAN SERVICE CONTRACT
INVENTORIES: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE AGENCY REPORTING AND REVIEW
EFFORTS 3–4 (2012). The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 required that fortynine federal agencies collect and report annually, among other data, the number of
contractor personnel they employ. Id. Other items were correctly reported, but due to
conflicting guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, the tally of contractor
personnel was not provided. Id. at 7–8. The tally will continue to be withheld pending a
proposed rule change in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Id.
2
See infra notes 24–44 and accompanying text (discussing recent examples of
contractors’ overseas crimes from U.S. operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan,
including rape, sex trafficking, and torture).
3
See Michael J. Davidson & Robert E. Korroch, Extending Military Jurisdiction to
American Contractors Overseas, 35 PROCUREMENT LAW. 1, 1 (Summer 2000).
4
These “hands-off” methods are illustrated by America’s response tactics in Libya
and Syria. See Paul Harris, Robert Gates: No US ‘Boots on Ground’ in Libya, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 31, 2011, 3:12 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/31/gates-rules-o
ut-american-troops-libya; Jessica Taylor, Pentagon Spokesman: No Boots on the Ground
in Syria, MSNBC (Sept. 4, 2013, 3:03 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/09/04/pentagon-sp
okesman-no-boots-on-the-ground-in-syria/. Both sources emphasize that plans in Syria
and Libya did not include putting “boots on the ground.” Harris, supra; Taylor, supra.
5
See discussion infra Part II.C.1–II.C.3 regarding the potential downfalls of amending
the qui tam provisions to include contractor crimes overseas and Part IV.B.1–IV.B.2
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One proposed solution—or one element of a system of solutions—to the
accountability gap is to expand the qui tam provisions of the False Claims
Act (FCA)6 beyond fraud to include criminal acts or human rights abuses.7
This Note will argue that although accountability for government contractors overseas will remain a problem absent some action, legislative or otherwise, expanding the FCA’s qui tam provisions would be inappropriate
given the provisions’ complexity, broad scope, undesirable economic incentives, and the availability of preferable statutory alternatives. Instead, this
Note will argue that Congress should build on the successes of the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)8 by passing its corollary, the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA).9 Even as operations in Iraq10
and Afghanistan11 wind down, the federal government’s need for service
contractors overseas in other, non-military related capacities will remain, if
not grow.12 Despite—and perhaps because of—reduced military forces in

regarding the potential benefits of a civilian corollary to the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act.
6
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–31 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
7
LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE 96 (2011).
8
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat.
2488 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2000 & Supp. 2004)).
9
See Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010, S. 2979, 111th Cong. (2d Sess.
2010). The House version, H.R. 4567, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010), was identical to the
Senate version; both died in committee. See also Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
of 2011, S. 1145, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). The corresponding House version was
H.R. 2136, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); again, both died in committee. Perhaps a third
attempt will be successful. However, there is no version of CEJA under consideration in
the 113th Congress.
10
See Jake Tapper, Obama Announces Complete Drawdown of U.S. Troops from Iraq
by Year’s End, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011, 12:45 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/polit
ics/2011/10/obama-to-announce-complete-drawdown-of-u-s-troops-from-iraq-by-yearsend/. Note that while the “drawdown” of troops in Iraq happened over a year prior to the
publication of this Note, approximately 17,000 government contractors remain employed
to continue work in the country. See Ted Galen Carpenter, The Iraq Debacle Continues,
NAT’L INT. (Jan. 3, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-iraq-debacle-contin
ues-7922.
11
See Mark Landler & Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Is Open to Withdraw Afghan Force
After 2014, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at A8.
12
See War Profiteering and Other Contractor Crimes Committed Overseas: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 48 (2007) [hereinafter War Profiteering] (statement of Scott
Horton, Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law) (“The force
profile has changed dramatically. The current mix draws far more heavily on civilians
than at any time in our history ....”).
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Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will continue to employ contractors to support the work that remains to be done there such as infrastructure and humanitarian efforts. Senator Leahy, a sponsor of the CEJA,
predicted that as the drawdowns continue “fewer and fewer of the thousands of Americans who stay on in these countries will be covered by
current law.”13 Therefore, it remains vital that Congress pass a civilian
corollary to the MEJA to close the accountability gap for contractors employed both in current and future engagements.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SERVICE CONTRACTORS, THEIR EMPLOYMENT, AND
THEIR PERFORMANCE
A. History of the Use of Service Contractors
The federal government has increasingly relied on contractors to support deployed forces since the middle of the twentieth century.14 At one
point before the 2007 “surge,” there were about 100,000 contractors in
Iraq, compared with 125,000 uniformed personnel, or just over forty percent of total personnel.15 The World War II and Korean War contractor
figures are utterly dwarfed by those in Iraq and Afghanistan, “in both of
those conflicts, the percentage of contract personnel involved would have
run between 3 percent and 5 percent.”16
Two factors explain the dramatic increase in the use of contractors
since the 1991 Persian Gulf War: (1) the change in the nature of American
military engagements abroad, and (2) decreased political tolerance for
increasing troop numbers overseas.17 The nature of American engagements
overseas has changed from the clashes of great powers seen in the two
13

Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Judiciary Committee Reports LeahyAuthored Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (June 23, 2011), http://www.l
eahy.senate.gov/press/senate-judiciary-committee-reports-leahy-authored-civilian-extrate
rritorial-jurisdiction-act.
14
See War Profiteering, supra note 12, at 48.
15
Id. See also Scott Horton, Providing Accountability for Private Military
Contractors: Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on June 19, 2007,
HARPER’S MAG. (June 19, 2007, 4:00 PM), http://harpers.org/print/?pid=309.
16
War Profiteering, supra note 12, at 48.
17
Charles Tiefer, No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of Private Security
Contractors in Iraq and After, 88 OR. L. REV. 745, 752–53 (2009). At its peak, the U.S.
government employed 180,000 contractors in Iraq, of which 30,000 provided security
services. Id. at 753. In contrast, the U.S. employed an estimated 9,200 contractors during
the Persian Gulf War. Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq, WASH.
POST, Dec. 5, 2006, at D01.
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World Wars to the rise of counterinsurgency operations and humanitarian
efforts conducted by the Department of Defense.18 The late 1990s conflict
in the Balkans marked a shift in the way America finances and staffs these
engagements.19 Professor Laura A. Dickinson describes the political climate
during the Clinton administration as one in which the nation was too disturbed to see troops involved in humanitarian conflicts following the disastrous loss of American military lives in Somalia.20 Nor was there any popular enthusiasm for adding to the size of the federal workforce at the time.21
In fact, both the military and federal civilian workforce were cut drastically
leading up to the Balkans conflict.22 Not only does the use of contractors
solve the logistical issue of how to staff engagements without growing the
federal work force, but to some extent, contracting with private firms for
necessary services solves both of these problems.23
B. Contractor Accountability Failures in Recent Conflicts
1. DynCorp in the Balkans
During the 1990’s U.S. engagement in the Balkans, the Department of
State hired military contractor DynCorp to provide training to Bosnian
police.24 Employees of DynCorp were accused of running a sex trafficking
operation—buying and selling women and girls as young as twelve, and
purchasing passports for them so they could be “exported.”25 One employee
18

See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JENNIFER CHURCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43074,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF CONTRACTORS TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS:
BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2–3 (2013).
19
See DICKINSON, supra note 7, at 33–34.
20
Id. at 34 (“Determined to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the Clinton administration
was nevertheless haunted by the specter of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets
in Somalia during Clinton’s first venture in committing U.S. forces to humanitarian
intervention, and so the political pressure on Clinton to minimize U.S. casualties was
particularly high.”).
21
Id. at 33–34. Moreover, there was not much ability to do so; at least not in a timely
manner. Id. (“‘It always was much easier to add contractors’ because funding was much
more readily available. Moreover ... in filling the position [with a contractor] fewer rules
applied, so ‘you could hire someone much more quickly.’” (quoting a senior official at
the U.S. Government Accountability Office)).
22
See id. at 32, 34–35.
23
See id. at 33–34. It is estimated that by the end of the conflict, there were about as
many contractors as military personnel in the Balkans. Id. at 34.
24
See DICKINSON, supra note 7, at 34.
25
Kelly Patricia O’Meara, DynCorp Disgrace, INSIGHT MAG., Feb. 4, 2002, at 12 (“[I]t
was no different than slavery.” (quoting whistleblower Ben Johnston)); David Isenberg, It’s
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even filmed himself in the act of abusing his victims.26 The employees
involved suffered few, if any, legal consequences: they were transferred
back to the United States, the Army and the United Nations conducted
investigations, and DynCorp fired some of the employees involved.27
2. Abu Ghraib in Iraq
The Abu Ghraib prison scandal is one of the most notorious U.S. abuses
in Iraq; it involved not only American soldiers but also contractors employed by the Department of the Interior.28 The scandal was a major motivation for amending the language29 in the MEJA.30 The amended language
extended jurisdiction to contractors and sub-contractors employed by any
federal agency “to the extent such employment relates to supporting the
mission of the Department of Defense overseas.”31
3. Nisour Square in Baghdad, Iraq
In September 2007 in Baghdad’s Nisour Square, Blackwater32 guards
who were contracted to provide diplomatic security services were involved in a highly-publicized incident in which seventeen Iraqis died.33

Déjà Vu for DynCorp All Over Again, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2010, 8:47 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/its-dj-vu-for-dyncorp-all_b_792394.html.
26
Isenberg, Déjà Vu, supra note 25.
27
See id.
28
See DICKINSON, supra note 7, at 57. As of 2011, twelve soldiers involved had been
punished by the military, yet not a single contractor involved had been held accountable. Id.
See also Scott Shane, Some U.S. Prison Contractors May Avoid Charges, BALT. SUN, May
24, 2004, at A1 (“The U.S. civilian interrogators questioning prisoners at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq work … under a … contract … from the Department of the Interior ….”).
29
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-375, § 1088, 118 Stat. 1811, 2066–67 (2004) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A)(iii)(II)).
30
Shane, supra note 28 (“[L]egal experts say [that] contractors for nonmilitary
agencies such as the Department of the Interior may be able to escape prosecution for
crimes they commit overseas because of an apparent loophole in the [MEJA]. The law,
passed in 2000, applies only to contractors with the Department of Defense—a flaw some
members of Congress want to remedy.”).
31
§ 1088, 118 Stat. at 2066.
32
Blackwater changed its name in 2009 to “Xe Services,” and again in 2011 to
“Academi.” Former Blackwater Firm Renamed Again, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2011, 1:28
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16149971.
33
DICKINSON, supra note 7, at 1.
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One investigation found that fourteen of these deaths were “unjustified.”34
A subsequent report found that none of the deaths were justified.35
4. Government Contractors Hiring and Supporting Warlords in
Afghanistan
The Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that the behavior of
certain security contractors in Afghanistan represented a “sharp detour”
from the U.S. mission.36 The report detailed multiple instances where Afghan nationals employed by the United States as subcontractors for security
services were connected with the Taliban.37 The American primary contractors implicated also might have been indirectly funding local “warlords,” as
well as the Taliban.38 In one of the more egregious instances described in
the report, a raid was conducted on a Taliban meeting, which later was
discovered to have been hosted in the home of a local subcontractor.39
Additionally, some subcontractors hired by the American primary contractors as guards were alleged to be Iranian intelligence agents.40
5. “Interrogations” By Central Intelligence Contractor in Afghanistan
Mr. David Passaro’s “interrogation” of an Afghan national suspected
of orchestrating attacks on an American military facility is another glaring
example of contractors’ misdeeds in Afghanistan.41 The interrogation
spanned two days and resulted in the suspect’s death.42 Mr. Passaro, a
34

Id. (citing David Johnston & John M. Broeder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis
Without Cause: Report on Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1).
35
Id. (citing Blackwater Faulted by U.S. Military: Report, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2007,
5:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/05/us-iraq-contractors-report-idUSN0
439965120071005?sp=true).
36
See S. REP. NO. 111-345, at ix (2010) (“Conclusion 1: The proliferation of private
security personnel in Afghanistan is inconsistent with the counterinsurgency strategy.…
Conclusion 2: Afghan warlords and strongmen operating as force providers to private
security contractors have acted against U.S. and Afghan government interests.”); Scott
Horton, Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan Fueling the Taliban, Senate Report
Concludes, HARPER’S MAG. (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://harpers.org/blog/2010/10
/private-security-contractors-in-afghanistan-fueling-the-tal iban-senate-report-concludes/.
37
Karen DeYoung, US Contract Failures Said to Aid the Enemy, WASH. POST, Oct. 8,
2010, at A1.
38
Id.
39
Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 111-345, at iii.
40
DeYoung, supra note 37.
41
United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 2009).
42
Id. at 211–12.
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contractor employed by the CIA, beat the suspect both with his hands and
with a foot-long, Maglite-type flashlight, and kicked him forcefully enough
to lift him off the ground.43 The suspect later died of injuries sustained during the interrogation.44
C. The False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provisions As an Option For
Accountability
In the face of these high-profile criminal allegations, many scholars and
commentators have made suggestions to fill the accountability gap and
punish contractors who commit crimes outside of the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.45 For example, Professor Laura Dickinson has suggested expanding the qui tam provisions of the FCA beyond their traditional use
in prosecutions for contractor fraud against the government to include human rights abuses.46 In suggesting this, Dickinson describes the FCA generally, referring to relators—the term used to describe those members of the
public who bring qui tam claims—as potentially recovering money for
successfully “exposing contractor wrongdoing.”47 Professor Dickinson’s
suggestion is that, among other changes, the qui tam provisions of the FCA
ought to be extended to include instances of reporting crimes—other than
submitting fraudulent claims to the government—committed by contractors, especially human rights abuses.48 This suggestion is overly simplistic
considering the complexity of the FCA and its qui tam provisions, the
undesirable economic incentives they provide, and the availability of preferable statutory alternatives.49
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND ITS QUI TAM PROVISIONS
Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase, qui tam pro domino rege quam
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur—he who pursues this action on behalf of

43

Id.
See id. at 212.
45
Professor Dickinson herself suggests many other options to improve accountability
for contractors. See generally DICKINSON, supra note 7.
46
Id. at 96.
47
Id.
48
See id.
49
Id. (suggesting that these changes “would go a long way toward making sure that
any contract-based efforts to provide accountability will have back-end enforcement to
encourage compliance.”).
44
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the King as well as for himself.50 The FCA’s qui tam provisions incentivize private citizens to bring civil actions on behalf of the government (the
King) against those suspected of defrauding the government by awarding
relators—those who report the fraud and bring the suit—a portion of the
damages recovered, whether or not the government chooses to intervene.51
The FCA’s legislative roots date back to the Civil War era52 with the
Informer’s Act of 1863.53 However, the qui tam process was so abused
after the Civil War that the government’s ability to effectively initiate its
own fraud investigations suffered.54 Congress amended the qui tam process several times as the legislative pendulum swung back and forth between extremes of how much power individuals had to initiate and control
the course of the litigation against a fraudulent contractor.55
During World War II, members of the public exploited a “loophole” in
the Act that allowed a relator to bring a qui tam action based on information the government already had, including information from ongoing
investigations.56 Congress patched the loophole with the False Claims Act
of 1943.57 The 1943 FCA58 gave complete control over the process to the
Department of Justice (DOJ).59 “Thereafter the qui tam provision was
largely ignored as a dead letter of U.S. law for another 40 years.”60
During the expansive military buildup under President Reagan’s administration, government contractors’ fraudulent claims again attracted much
public attention and ire.61 In 1986, Congress again amended the FCA,62
restoring some power over the qui tam process to individual relators.63 The
balance of power over the litigation in qui tam actions is much the same
50

Robin Page West, Being a Qui Tam Whistleblower: It’s Not for Everybody, BUS. L.
TODAY, May–June 2008, at 31, 35; see also William Y. Culbertson, Whistleblowers and
Prosecutors: Achieving the Best Interests of the Public, BUS. L. TODAY, May–June 2008,
at 30, 32.
51
See CARL J. PECKINPAUGH, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES 335–36 (1997).
52
See West, supra note 50, at 35.
53
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
54
PECKINPAUGH, supra note 51, at 335.
55
See id.
56
See Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32.
57
See id.
58
Act of Dec. 23, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-213, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (current version at
31 U.S.C. § 3730).
59
Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153.
63
See Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32.
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today.64 The 1986 FCA amendments balanced incentives for individuals to
initiate proceedings with the government’s interests in controlling and
initiating its own fraud investigations.65 “The obvious purpose for bringing
back this abandoned provision in 1986 was to punish fraud and, like the
old law, it had two basic components: encouraging whistleblowers and
allowing its prosecution through private lawyers.”66 These amendments,
restoring some control over the litigation to individual relators, greatly
increased the number of fraud incidents reported.67
The 1986 FCA amendments differed in purpose in an important way
from the 1863 Informer’s Act. By 1986 the government had many more
prosecutors on staff than in 1863, and thus was theoretically much more
able to investigate fraud on its own, “which made it necessary for proponents to criticize the DOJ in order to rationalize the private lawyers’ role
in the modern era.”68 This difference means the Act not only sets a rogue
to catch a rogue, but also sets a rogue to discover fraud that apathetic,
unwary, or under-trained government watchdogs miss.
Lastly, Congress amended some FCA provisions through the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act69 in 2009 in response to judicial interpretations of the FCA.70 These amendments included statutory clarifications
on the nuances of what constitutes a cognizable claim and procedures for
filing a claim.71
A. Basic Mechanics of Qui Tam Actions
Generally, any member of the public with original knowledge of the
fraud may bring a suit.72 The individual who brings the action on behalf of
the government is known as a relator.73 However, the relator’s information
64

See id.
See PECKINPAUGH, supra note 51, at 335.
66
Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32.
67
See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
68
Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32.
69
Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
70
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS
ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 8 (2009) [hereinafter DOYLE, QUI TAM].
71
See id.; see also infra Part II.C.3 (discussing other, more potentially troublesome
developments in judicial interpretation).
72
PECKINPAUGH, supra note 51, at 337 (“The relator must be the original source of at
least some of the information that serves as the basis for the suit.”). The meaning of
“original source” is a hotly debated topic, even after the 2009 amendments. See
discussion infra Part II.C.3.
73
PECKINPAUGH, supra note 51, at 335–37.
65
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may not have been obtained solely through public disclosure and must be
voluntarily disclosed by the relator to the government.74 This requirement
often serves to disqualify some government employees due to the nature of
their public sector employment.75 However, “[t]here is no blanket exclusion
of government employees as potential qui tam relators in False Claims Act
suits.”76 The 2009 FCA amendments did not change the qualifications for
becoming a qui tam relator.77 Other portions of the 2009 FCA amendments
expand the nature of claims that bring liability, including a negative or “reverse” fraud claim for contractors who seek to avoid making obligatory
payments to the government rather than to obtain unearned payments from
the government.78
The qui tam provisions are intended to encourage private individuals to
prosecute fraud on behalf of the government, but the government always
retains the right to intervene in the suit.79 The Attorney General has discretion to bring the action and to control the litigation from the outset.80 Even
when the government does not intervene, the “litigation takes place in the
shadow of the government’s prerogatives.”81 The government may also
dismiss or settle the action over the objections of the relator,82 though the
government rarely exercises its option to dismiss the case to the disadvantage of the relator.83
B. Reward Scheme of Qui Tam Provisions
The relator is entitled to an incentive scheme of payouts if the qui tam
suit is successful, though the amount of the reward depends upon several
74

Id.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir.
1995) (observing that allowing government employees to commence qui tam suits on
frauds they learned of while on duty would create “perverse incentives”). Non-voluntary
disclosures, such as those required by the terms of certain government employees’ duty to
report fraud, will not suffice to establish the relator’s status as the original source of the
information. Id. at 744.
76
5B FED. PROC., L. ED. § 10:61 (2004).
77
See DOYLE, QUI TAM, supra note 70, at 8.
78
Id. at 14.
79
Id. at 9.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B)).
83
See Paula J. Zimmerman, Note, The Sequoia Significance: The Role of the Civil False
Claims Act’s Dismissal Provision in Procurement Reform, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 329, 338
(2000) (discussing the only case in which the DOJ has exercised the dismissal provision).
75
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factors.84 A relator who pursues the litigation alone is entitled to between
twenty-five and thirty percent of the proceeds of the suit or settlement.85 If
the government chooses to intervene, the relator is entitled to between
fifteen and twenty-five percent.86 If the relator’s contribution was minimal—such as if the information provided was gleaned from easily accessible sources or constituted only a small piece of the “puzzle”—his reward
might be as low as ten percent.87 If the court finds that the relator participated in the fraud at issue, the court can decrease the reward.88
C. Issues Resulting from Expansion Beyond Fraud Purposes of Qui Tam
Provisions in False Claims Act
At first glance, the FCA seems like an attractive option for increasing
accountability over government contractors by bringing more crimes to
light and by holding the contracting companies accountable for the crimes
of their employees. At the most general level, the FCA is an investigative
force multiplier, turning everyday citizens into investigators for the government.89 However, the potential efficacy and desirability of the FCA in
this context are constrained in several important ways even when applied
to instances of fraud, as initially was intended.
The Informer’s Act of 1863,90 also known as the “Lincoln Law,”91 was
enacted to incentivize civilians to root out Union suppliers’ corrupt and
fraudulent practices.92 Or, as one sponsor of the Informer’s Act put it, the
law’s purpose was “setting a rogue to catch a rogue.”93 Expanding the
FCA to encourage reporting service contractors’ overseas crimes would
not be just another application of economic incentives for civilians to
84

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
§ 3730(d)(2).
86
§ 3730(d)(1).
87
§ 3730(d)(1).
88
§ 3730(d)(3).
89
See PAUL VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 178 (2007) (“By incentivizing
private relators who retain a portion of the amounts recovered when the government has
been defrauded, the government adds significantly to its contract monitoring resources at
a time when contracting personnel are in short supply.” (footnote omitted)); West, supra
note 50, at 35 (“Because of the complexity of these frauds and the insider knowledge
necessary to understand them, the government would be at a loss to discover or piece
together the schemes without the help of insiders.”).
90
§§ 3729–33.
91
West, supra note 50, at 35.
92
See id.
93
Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32.
85
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reveal and explain to the government their co-workers’ accounting trickery. Such an expansion would be more akin to a government scheme offering rewards to encourage criminal witnesses to come forward, with the
amount of the award varying according to the severity of the crime and the
criminals’ employers paying for those rewards, but only if the prosecution
is successful. To elaborate on this analogy, these results could all be accomplished without ever prosecuting the individual criminals, who would
be tried in separate proceedings. Without Congress passing the CEJA94 the
United States may not have the necessary criminal jurisdiction to follow
up with those prosecutions, even if the crimes are known to the government absent reporting by the public.
While the FCA permits the government to hold accountable organizations that have defrauded the government, qui tam actions fail to hold
criminally accountable the individual perpetrators of the fraud, as only the
company is liable for damages.95 Fining government contracting firms for
their employees’ individual overseas criminal actions makes little sense
from a policy perspective, unless the relator can show some privity or
knowledge by the contracting company. It would be absurd to fine employers because their employees committed crimes outside the scope of
their duties here at home; it would be equally absurd to do so for crimes
committed by employees outside of the United States.
1. Perverse Incentives Created By Qui Tam Provisions
Even “normal” qui tam actions for fraud are affected by perverse economic incentives that influence a potential relator’s decision to bring the
fraud to light, a lawyer’s decision to take or encourage the suit, and a contracting company’s decision to maintain internal compliance systems.
These incentives are all the more distasteful when considering the possibility they affect the reporting of such misdeeds described above in Part
I.B. that could otherwise be prosecuted under the MEJA or the CEJA.
94

See infra notes 169–84 and accompanying text (discussing CEJA and its benefits).
The jurisdictional gap that currently allows contractors to escape punishment can be closed
without changing the FCA and incurring its negative consequences. Infra notes 169–84.
95
The FCA does contain criminal provisions for prosecuting individual defrauders,
but those criminal sanctions are prosecuted by the government rather than civilian
whistleblowers. See Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal
Liability, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2007). In some cases the defrauder could be
risking execution. Id. at 625-26, 625 n.4 (citing Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent,
Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 32 (2005)).
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a. Perverse Incentives For Individual Relators
The structure of the qui tam provisions incentivizes relators to wait for
the fraud to accumulate until the potential reward outweighs the potential
costs of coming forward, including the costs of litigation.96 A reward based
upon the severity of the crime or fraud uncovered creates the temptation to
allow the fraud to accumulate in order to earn a larger reward, resulting in
the fraud continuing past the point at which it is socially optimal to intervene—which most would agree is immediately upon discovering the
crime or fraud.97 Additionally, “[t]he incentive to delay will be greatest
where few people know of the misconduct, and thus the number of potential competing relators is small.”98 Security classifications would shield
contractors’ actions from public view in some instances, constraining the
universe of people who could discover the wrongdoing, and thereby encouraging potential relators to sit on the information until the most opportune moment. All of the security contractor misconduct examples discussed above involved a relatively small number of potential competing
qui tam relators, especially the Passaro case.99
b. Perverse Incentives For Relators’ Attorneys
Incentive structures intended as enforcement systems, such as the qui
tam provisions of the FCA, “can generate excessive litigation,”100 undermining efficiency gains from deputizing the public as fraud investigators.
Relators’ attorneys suffer, and succumb to, the temptation of this system
as much as any other party to qui tam actions:
When private lawyers litigate on behalf of our government, shouldn’t
the DOJ be expected to pay for the benefit? Defendants are never required to pay the tab of the public prosecutor, and to say that private
lawyers are paid on a contingency basis does not make it free to the
public, let alone to defendants.... Given the extraordinary protections
built into the FCA, which prevent innocent defendants from holding

96

See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Providers
in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1829 (1996); see also Ben
Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the False Claims
Act, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 135, 136 (2006).
97
See Depoorter & De Mot, supra note 96, at 136.
98
See Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1829.
99
See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
100
Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1825.
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whistleblowers or their lawyers responsible for filing speculative complaints, most simply settle.101

Relators’ attorneys, fully aware of the government contractors’ tendency
to settle, have no incentive to temper their clients’ enthusiasm for filing
over-zealous complaints.
c. Perverse Incentives For the Government Agencies Defrauded
Even assuming that the fraud is reported, and that the DOJ intends to intervene in the suit, a conflict of interest can exist for the agencies that have
been defrauded.102 When making the decision to intervene in a qui tam
action, the DOJ receives advice from the federal agency that was defrauded.103 Those agencies might be less than enthusiastic about publicizing the
fraud, particularly if the facts show that the agencies’ employees turned a
blind eye to the issue.104 Approval, tacit or otherwise, by the federal agency
is likely to be raised as a defense by contractors, as occurred in the prosecution of the Passaro case. 105
2. Claims Can Result In Taxpayer-Funded Waste In and Of
Themselves
Pursuing a qui tam action after the DOJ has declined to intervene might
amount to a waste of taxpayer funds itself, even absent greed on the part of
the relator.106 A relator’s ability to bring a qui tam action can weaken the
101

Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32–33.
See VERKUIL, supra note 89, at 179.
103
See id.
104
In the conversations surrounding the amendments to the qui tam provisions in the
1980s, it was revealed that the DOJ dropped three prosecutions for fraud because “the
procurement agencies had tacitly approved the contractors’ conduct and, as a result,
prosecution was unwarranted.” Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32. See VERKUIL, supra
note 89, at 179 (“The [defrauded] agencies’ judgment is a function both of [sic] the
merits of the claims and the potential embarrassment public revelation might produce. In
some circumstances, this may result in a conflict. The Department of the Interior’s
decision to settle or not pursue claims against companies who have oil leases on
government land, which are being maintained by private relators is an example in this
regard.” (citing Edmund L. Andrews, Suits Say U.S. Impeded Audits for Oil Leases, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at A1)).
105
R. Jeffrey Smith, Interrogator Says U.S. Approved Handling of Detainee Who
Died, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at A07; see also supra notes 41–44 and accompanying
text (discussing United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207 (2009)).
106
See Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32–33 (“Once the DOJ declines to intervene in qui
tam cases, the role of private lawyers is fraught with conflicts and causes demonstrable
102
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government’s bargaining power with the fraudulent contractor, making
contractors less willing to negotiate and adopt mediating measures.107 Even
if the contracting company were to comply with the proposed solutions or
settlements for the challenged behavior that the DOJ might suggest, the
government cannot always prevent a suit by a qui tam relator,108 which
can be costly to contracting firms, even if the contracting companies go on
to settle with the relator. An additional flaw of the qui tam provisions,
which often leads to waste, is the lack of proper disincentives for filing
frivolous qui tam actions.109 Therefore, as the number of suits filed increases, “it is inevitable that there are more meritless suits among
them.”110 As qui tam actions have skyrocketed,111 the lack of repercussions for frivolous suits seems likely to create a vicious cycle in which the
contracting companies are ever more likely to settle with frivolous relators
as a cost of doing business.
3. Effects of Qui Tam Provisions On Contractors’ Internal
Management Actions
Additionally, the possibility of qui tam suits distorts the business decision-making processes of the contracting firms themselves. The statutory
scheme discourages contracting firms from creating an open atmosphere
within their company for fear that employees might discover potential
fraud and attempt to cash in through a qui tam suit. This could force a
company to operate less efficiently by stifling internal communication.112
The company might also over-invest in consensus, seeking to discourage

waste of taxpayer money and palpable abuse of innocent defendants.”); see also Kovacic,
supra note 96, at 1829–30 (discussing a scenario in which the relator argued that he
waited to file his action not out of greed but due to “his fear that the recipient of the bribe
was prepared to have [him] killed”).
107
Depoorter & De Mot, supra note 96, at 158.
108
Under some circumstances, the government can dismiss a qui tam suit over the
objections of the relator, though it rarely utilizes this option. See Zimmerman, supra note
83, at 330 (“[As of 2000, the DOJ] has only dismissed one such case against the wishes
of the relator.”).
109
Id. at 330.
110
Id. at 345.
111
See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS-OTHER (NON-HHS,
NON-DOD) 2 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Stat
istics.pdf (reporting that newly received referrals, investigations, and qui tam actions
ballooned from 7 in 1987 to 178 in 2012).
112
Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1834.
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those on the losing end of internal decisions from initiating a lawsuit.113
The temptation to bring qui tam actions also discourages employees who
have uncovered fraud from using any internal reporting systems.114 Contractors might also hesitate to discipline employees that might become
litigious, or might terminate employees on overly generous terms in order
to avoid qui tam suits.115
4. Increased Litigation Costs To Contractors
In addition to the impacts on internal decision-making, contracting
firms must also prepare for the eventuality of becoming the subject of a
baseless qui tam suit. Relators can be wrong, spiteful, or over-zealous in
their pursuit of qui tam actions. Some relators might initiate litigation
based on a mistaken understanding of the behavior, or might deliberately
mischaracterize an innocuous situation in order to extract a settlement.116
The qui tam scheme could also create a race to file suit. The scheme might
prompt the government to litigate before its case is sufficiently prepared in
order to keep a potential relator from participating—or interfering—in the
litigation and ultimately sharing in the proceeds collected from the contracting company, mimicking the race to court seen between relators.117
Recent developments in the judicial interpretation of the qui tam provisions also leave contracting companies in doubt of the relative strength
of their case. In Little v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.,118 the Fifth
Circuit recently held that qui tam actions can be brought by relators who
uncover fraud in the course of their duties as government employees only
so long as their reporting of the discovered fraud was “voluntary.”119
However, the decision also leaves room for increased litigation from other
government employees whose job description is less clear on the point of
duty to disclose fraud than auditors such as those in Little.120 “[I]t suggests
113

See id. at 1827.
See Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1830–31. Contracting companies are encouraged to
establish internal compliance systems such as hotlines and internal audits. Id. at 1831.
Their FCA fines might be reduced if they have these systems in place. Id.
115
See id. at 1826–27.
116
See id. at 1831–32.
117
See id. at 1839.
118
690 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2012).
119
See id. at 294 (“[T]he fact that a relator ‘was employed specifically to disclose
fraud is sufficient to render his disclosures nonvoluntary.’” (quoting United States ex rel.
Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc))).
120
Roderick L. Thomas et al., Little v. Shell—Bad News for Government Contractors,
GOV’T CONT. L. 360 (Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.wileyrein.com/publication
s.cfm?sp=articles&id=8251.
114
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that contract administrators and other government employees can bring
whistleblower actions even if their agency superiors do not find the alleged misconduct worthy of further investigation,” which leaves open the
potential for an increase in the number of actions by disgruntled government employees.121 The Little decision falls in accord with other, similarly
expansive decisions from the First and Ninth Circuits.122
To illustrate the scope of qui tam actions, in fiscal year 2012 alone there
were 178 new qui tam matters in which the defrauded agency was neither
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) nor DoD.123 For DoD
alone, in 2012 there were 57 qui tam matters.124 In 1987 there were no qui
tam actions for either DoD or HHS in which the government intervened.125
These increased costs of operation in the government contracting market—especially as compared to the relatively less risky opportunities
available in the private market for like services—create a disincentive for
firms to enter the market, and thus to compete for government contracts.126
Firms whose current business portfolio involves a mix of private- and
public-sector opportunities might be tempted to leave the market or rebalance their portfolio in favor of private sector opportunities.127 As in any
market, decreased competition generally “creat[es] the potential for a
costlier, lower-quality product.”128 One need only imagine the dire results
of employing a “lower quality” security contractor in the chaotic or highstress situations that arise in the course of security contractors’ duties
overseas to see that this effect is undesirable.
III. CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ALREADY IN FORCE
A. Market Preferences for “Good” Companies
Several accountability mechanisms already exist to encourage government contracting firms to act legally and in accordance with public
121

Id.
See United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir.
1995); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
123
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 111. “Matters”
include newly received referrals, investigations, and qui tam actions. Id. at 2.
124
Id. at 6. By comparison, there were only twelve non-qui tam actions in 2012. Id.
125
Id. at 5.
126
Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1839–40 (“For firms that previously have not done
business with federal agencies, the existence of such costs can discourage entry into
government procurement markets.”).
127
Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1840.
128
Id.
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norms. Contracting companies that provide military or security services
to the government, like any other business, stand to suffer or benefit
from their public reputation.129 The interest in maintaining a good public
reputation presumably dissuades contractors from violations of the same
criminal laws enforced “at home.” For example, there was a 2010 movie
loosely based on the DynCorp Bosnian sex-trafficking scandal.130 The movie,
entitled The Whistleblower,131 and a non-fiction book with the same title coauthored by one of the women who brought the DynCorp scandal to light,132
elicited a public statement from DynCorp International.133 In the statement,
the company attempted to distance itself from the decade-old scandal and to
highlight the procedures it had since put in place to prevent such behavior in
the future.134 The company’s reputation was seriously tarnished by the actions
of its employees, and its name became synonymous with contractor scandal
long before Blackwater achieved its present level of notoriety.135 Blackwater

129

See P. W. Singer, CORPORATE WARRIORS 217 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2003) (“By
privatizing military services, certain motivations for good behavior appear to be
increased. In specific, military firms do not simply kill for no good reason. Thus, blanket
accusations of the industry as a whole as being an enterprise of evil, violent greed,
generally ring false on deeper examination. Rather, [private military firms] are businesses
with certain goals. Military provider firms do use violence, but their general goal is not
violence for its own sake, but rather to achieve the task for which they were hired.
Considering the increasingly messy wars of the twenty-first century, the firms’ personnel
also operate with far greater military professionalism than most actors in local conflicts.”).
Note that the author is comparing private military firms with local actors worldwide,
including local militias in sub-Saharan Africa, not necessarily American or coalition troops
in the recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But see id. at 218 (“[C]orporate
responsibility and a nice public image have their limits. As profit-driven actors, they will
make operational decisions also influenced by their bottom lines. So, although it is wrong to
assume that military provider firms just kill for money, there may be some situations where
transgressing human rights may be in their corporate interests.”).
130
Isenberg, Déjà Vu, supra note 25.
131
THE WHISTLEBLOWER (Samuel Goldwyn Films 2010).
132
KATHRYN BOLKOVAC & CARI LYNN, THE WHISTLEBOWER: SEX TRAFFICKING,
MILITARY CONTRACTORS, AND ONE WOMAN’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2011).
133
Press Release, DynCorp International, DynCorp International Statement on “The
Whistleblower” (on file with author).
134
Id.
135
See Isenberg, Déjà Vu, supra note 25. To illustrate the extent to which DynCorp
was marred by this incident, “[t]he negative impact of just those two cases cannot be
overstated. Indeed, search online for ‘dyncorp AND sex scandal’ as I just did and you get
nearly nine thousand hits. DynCorp spent many years trying to move past the bad
publicity resulting from these cases.” Id.
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also tried to distance itself from its own scandal, rebranding itself as Xe.136
When that did not work—Xe lost a State Department contract despite the new
name—the name was changed again to Academi.137
B. Local Nations’ Laws
Although contractors are currently protected from prosecution under local laws in Iraq and Afghanistan, one accountability solution would be to
expose them to criminal or civil liability under local laws.138 In the wake of
the Nisour Square incident, one response to the contractor accountability
gap was a call to waive the immunity that had been negotiated with the Iraqi
government.139 “One remedy is not being discussed: the State Department
can waive immunity for contractors and let the case be tried in the Iraqi
courts under Order 17, which is the section of the Transitional Administrative Law approved in 2004 that gives contractors immunity.”140
C. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
There have been a handful of successful criminal prosecutions of contractors under the MEJA.141 The DOJ announced in January 2012 that
Keith Strimple pleaded guilty under the MEJA to multiple child exploitation charges.142 When these crimes were committed in 2007, Strimple was
employed by a government contractor as a plumber at Camp Fallujah in
136

Blackwater Name Change: Private Security Firm Switches Name Again to Academi
From Xe, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20
11/12/12/blackwater-name-change-private-security-firm-academi_n_1143789.html.
137
Id.
138
In Afghanistan, the legal status of contractors was “ambiguously” addressed in
diplomatic notes. David Isenberg, Dogs of War, U.P.I. (Jan. 12, 2009, 10:33 AM), http://
www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/01/12/Dogs-of-War-The-future-of-contractor-acc
ountability-immunity-or-impunity/UPI-88801231774390/tab-photos/. In Iraq, the order
granting immunity from the local justice system was negotiated such that in exchange for
not trying contractors in local courts contractors would be subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. See Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von Zielbauer, The Judgment Gap in a Case
Like the Blackwater Shootings, There Are Many Laws But More Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2007, at A1; infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text (discussing the Uniform
Code of Military Justice).
139
See Rubin & von Zielbauer, supra note 138.
140
Id.
141
18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2000).
142
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Employee of Government Contractor
Pleads Guilty in Oklahoma to Child Pornography Charge (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http:
//www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-crm-007.html.
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Iraq for approximately five months.143 Mr. Strimple admitted that during that
time, “he searched for and downloaded videos of minors that he believed to
be as young as 12 years old engaging in sexually explicit conduct and downloaded such images using the contractor’s computer system.”144 Incidentally,
even without financial incentives such as the qui tam provisions, Mr. Strimple
was caught as a result of information provided by an anonymous tipster.145
Another successful use of the MEJA146 is illustrated in United States v.
Arnt.147 In this case, the defendant, Mrs. LaTasha Arnt, fatally stabbed her
husband, a staff sergeant assigned to a military base in Turkey.148 Though
this case had a complicated history, the government was ultimately able to
show that Mrs. Arnt was “accompanying” the armed forces as a military
dependent.149 This case did not involve a contractor, but it highlights another potential gap in accountability: that of families accompanying contractors to posts overseas. While families are not likely to accompany
contractors to a combat zone, there is greater potential for this situation at
other locations overseas where non-DoD agencies and their employees
operate. These successful prosecutions are not only a testament to the
potential of a civilian corollary to the MEJA, but also to the flexibility
required of such a corollary due to the changing structure and mission of
the government’s employees overseas.
Despite these successes, accountability gaps remain. In a hearing on
the CEJA, Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division of the
DOJ, Lanny Breuer, described some of those gaps:
The unfortunate consequence of the current state of the law is that, for
example, a Department of Defense contractor who murders a colleague
in Iraq may be prosecuted under MEJA, while a contractor with another
U.S. agency who commits the very same crime may not be, since he or
she may not be covered by MEJA. Similarly, an employee with a nonDepartment of Defense agency who rapes a foreign national in the employee’s diplomatic residence may be prosecuted for committing a
143

David Harper, Tulsan Who Worked in Iraq Sentenced in Child Porn Case,
TULSA WORLD (Apr. 12, 2012, 2:40 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/tuls
an-who-worked-in-iraq-sentenced-in-child-porn-case/article_8f8fe907-d18c-5df7-b42
7-4fec05d4e93a.html; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 142.
144
Id.
145
Harper, supra note 143.
146
Note that this outcome would not be possible under the proposal to alter the qui
tam provisions, making a civilian corollary to the MEJA preferable.
147
474 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).
148
Id. at 1161.
149
See id. at 1162–63.
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crime within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, while the same person might not be able to be prosecuted
if he commits the same crime in the victim’s apartment.150

These hypothetical gaps are not unreasonable or far-fetched.
The government’s successful prosecution of Mr. David Passaro,151 a
contractor supporting the CIA in Afghanistan,152 illustrates the continued
challenges of conducting criminal prosecution under the MEJA’s jurisdiction.153 Though Mr. Passaro was ultimately successfully convicted, he was
convicted under the USA PATRIOT Act,154 not the MEJA, due to the
MEJA’s limited application only to contractors supporting the DoD.155
The Blackwater security guards implicated in the Nisour Square
shooting in Iraq were contractors employed by the Department of State,
whose contract stated their mission was diplomatic rather than supporting the DoD.156 Thus, because the case was dismissed on other grounds,
150

Holding Criminals Accountable: Extending Criminal Jurisdiction For Government
Contractors And Employees Abroad: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. Criminal
Div., Dep’t of Justice).
151
United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 956
(2010).
152
See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
153
Associated Press, CIA Contractor Is Charged Under the Patriot Act, U.S.A.
TODAY (June 18, 2004, 5:05 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-0618-pat.-act-charge_x.htm (“A federal law, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of
2000, allows for the prosecution in U.S. federal courts of civilians hired by the Defense
Department, relatives of U.S military members, and a few other types of people who
accompany military personnel in foreign countries. But the law is written in such a way
that CIA contractors are not subject to it.”).
154
Passaro, 577 F.3d at 212, 216.
155
See Holding Criminals Accountable, supra note 150, at 2 (statement of Lanny A.
Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice). Similarly, another CIA
contractor was convicted within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States for “abusive sexual contact” committed while he was stationed in Algiers.
Id. at 5 (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. Criminal Div., Dep’t of
Justice) (discussing United States v. Warren, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010)).
156
Their case was ultimately dismissed in United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d
112 (D.D.C. 2009). However, the dismissal means that “the jurisdiction of MEJA for
contractors working for a department other than Defense is uncertain. The decision by
Judge Urbina meant that the defendants’ argument that MEJA didn’t apply to them as
contractors working for the State Department in support of its mission never reached
trial.” David Isenberg, Contractors and the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenbe
rg/contractors-and-the-civil_b_446298.html [hereinafter Isenberg, Contractors].
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the question remains as to whether these contractors could have been
held accountable under the MEJA.157
D. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was amended at the
end of 2006 under legislation proposed by Senator Lindsey Graham,158 a
South Carolina Republican who is also in the Judge Advocate General
Corps of the United States Air Force Reserve,159 to hold accountable contractors “in declared wars or contingency operations.”160 However, disputes have arisen regarding whether this formulation would include State
Department contractors like Blackwater who provide security services for
a civilian agency like the Department of State.161 Therefore, under either
the MEJA or the UCMJ, prosecutorial doubt remains as to the effect of the
contractors’ status supporting an agency other than the DoD.162
IV. THE CIVILIAN EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT AND SIMILAR
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS
A. Predecessors to the CEJA
Representative David Price, a Democrat from North Carolina, the sponsor of both the 2010 and the 2011 CEJA bills in the House,163 has been
working to find a solution for the accountability gap since long before introducing the CEJA of 2010.164 In October 2007, Rep. Price introduced
legislation to amend the MEJA to cover all contractors working for the
U.S. government in war zones.165
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See Rubin & von Zielbauer, supra note 138.
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. (“As recently as Oct. 3, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates indicated that no
decision had been made on how to apply the new language. In other statements, Pentagon
officials have suggested that they would apply the military code to Defense Department
contractors. That could leave contractors working for other agencies, such as Blackwater,
outside military law.”).
163
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Remarking on the difficulty of trying the Blackwater contractors for
the Nisour Square shootings under either the MEJA or the UCMJ, one
journalist noted:
One irony is that back in October 2007 the House approved a bill introduced by Congressman Price which would ensure that the U.S. government has the legal authority to prosecute crimes committed by U.S. contractor personnel working in war zones. Defense Department contractors
were already covered under U.S. law, but contractors who worked for the
State Department and other agencies, were not liable for criminal activity
under current law. Price’s bill extended the jurisdiction of MEJA to cover
all contractors working for the government in a war zone.166

However, even the 2007 version of the bill introduced by Rep. Price
would have left open the legal question of the MEJA’s application to contractors employed by other government agencies operating in areas other
than war zones.
B. The 2010 and 2011 CEJA Proposals
Rep. Price and Sen. Leahy introduced versions of the CEJA in both
2010 and 2011.167 The 2011 version is quite similar to the one introduced
in 2010, though it addresses some concerns that were raised regarding the
2010 version of the bill.168
1. The CEJA Benefits To the Public
The CEJA of 2011 directs the DOJ to increase the number of investigators dedicated to contractor criminal allegations,169 which would seem to
be redundant of the force multiplier effect of an FCA extension. However,
in many of the instances cited as failures of contractor accountability, there
is not much need for an investigative “force multiplier” that includes everyday citizens, as the number of U.S. citizens privy to useful information is
necessarily low. In the Nisour Square incident, for example, the Department
of State contractors who fired into a crowd were surrounded by witnesses,
166
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but most of them were Iraqi citizens and therefore would not have been
able to bring qui tam actions.170 In that type of situation, there is already a
limited number of potential relators, regardless of the potential financial
reward. No amount of potential qui tam reward could multiply the investigative force in that instance.
The CEJA in its 2011 form would also allow the Attorney General to
authorize federal agents to arrest contractors who are suspected of having
committed crimes while they are still overseas.171 The Attorney General
would also be required to report to Congress annually on the number of
offenses prosecuted under the CEJA.172 Among other topics to be addressed, the annual report would recommend changes to make the CEJA
more effective,173 which would allow the law to be more responsive as the
use of contractors overseas continues to evolve.
The CEJA of 2011174 would also give the government many procedural advantages. If the defendant is located overseas at the time the
government is prepared to bring its case, the government is permitted to
pick the district in which to bring its case.175 If the defendant has already
returned to the United States when the government is prepared to make
an arrest or seek an indictment, the government has slightly less freedom
in choosing a venue.176 However, both the Senate and House versions
would still provide the government some additional flexibility.177 The
government could choose to pursue the case in the district in which “the
employing or contracting agency maintains its headquarters.”178 This
prosecutorial flexibility for the government might inconvenience some
defendants who do not reside in the district the government chooses, but
such an inconvenience in itself might be a valuable bargaining chip for the
government to encourage plea agreements.179
170
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Under the CEJA of 2011, prosecutions would no longer become bogged
down in the jurisdictional issues that currently hamper prosecutions under
the MEJA.180 Without a civilian complement to the MEJA, “[c]ases that
would otherwise be straightforward can turn into complex investigations.”181 The cases can be stalled while investigating the criminal conduct
in question, the specific terms of the defendant’s employment and duties
under the contract, and other facts to determine the exact nature of the defendant’s employment.182 These complex, fact-specific investigations can
become even more complicated when they need to be conducted in a combat zone or other remote location.183 Occasionally, the investigations are
further complicated by security classification issues.184 These complications could be avoided entirely if the CEJA or another civilian complement to the MEJA is passed.
2. The CEJA Benefits to Defendants
If passed, the CEJA may also be considered protective of individual
contractors. Rather than imposing an additional burden on contractors, the
CEJA could be part of a local agreement on contractors’ legal status. Considering some of the alternatives, such as prosecution under local laws,
Americans implicated in criminal prosecutions may prefer that their proceedings be handled by the more familiar American justice system.
A civilian corollary to the MEJA, such as the CEJA bills introduced by
Rep. Price in 2010 and 2011, would, at the most basic level, extend federal
criminal jurisdiction to wherever government contractors operate.185 As
such, there is not much of a learning curve for companies or their employees required; acts that would constitute federal crimes at “home” are most
likely also federal crimes when committed abroad. Consider the successful
use of the MEJA to prosecute incidents of child pornography as discussed
180
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that would be subject to federal prosecution had they occurred within the United States ....”).
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above, for example.186 These types of crimes are not the most obvious
when one mentions crimes committed by contractors overseas, yet the
illegality of those acts and criminal liability of those involved should be
utterly clear to any contractor, contracting company, or, especially, legal
counsel examining their potential liability.
CONCLUSION
The proposed expansion of the qui tam provisions of the FCA to reward relators who report instances of contractor crimes would be ineffective. Such a change would actually exacerbate the existing issues and
incentives with the qui tam scheme and might create a few more by causing changes to the internal operations of contracting companies. The same
end result—increased contractor accountability—could be achieved by
passing some version of the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act as a
complement to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which is a
proven criminal law scheme.
The successful convictions under the MEJA discussed above extend
far beyond the types of crimes typically associated in the headlines with
contractors overseas. This potential to adapt to new types of crimes and
new uses of contractors makes passing a law along the lines of the CEJA
preferable over changes to the qui tam provisions. Passing a version of the
CEJA would also ward off the perverse economic incentives inherent in
the qui tam provisions of the FCA. With any luck, Congress will be proactive and pass a civilian corollary to the MEJA now—in the relative calm
of large military drawdowns—rather than wait for some future scandal
before summoning the will to act.
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